How hotel owner-operator goal congruence and GM autonomy influence hotel performance

Hodari, Demian (Ecole hôtelière de Lausanne, HES-SO // University of Applied Sciences Western Switzerland) ; Turner, Michael J. (The University of Queensland, UQ Business School, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia) ; Sturman, Michael C. (Cornell University, School of Hotel Administration, Ithaca, NY, United States)

A principal-agent relationship exists between hotel owners and the management companies which often operate their hotels. In addition, they both act as principals to a mutual agent, the hotel's General Manager, who is tasked with trying to achieve each parties' objectives. Extensive research on hotel management agreements which govern the owner-operator relationship has demonstrated that these objectives are often incongruent. However, the property-level managerial and performance implications of their goal incongruence has not been empirically examined. This study analyzes these issues using a matched sample of surveys from both owners and operators across 64 hotels operated under hotel management agreements. Using structural equations modeling, we demonstrate that owner-operator goal congruence positively impacts hotel performance and that this relationship is both mediated and moderated by the hotel General Manager's autonomy.


Mots-clés:
Type d'article:
scientifique
Faculté:
Economie et Services
Ecole:
EHL Ecole hôtelière de Lausanne
Classification:
Economie/gestion
Date:
2017
Publié dans
International journal of hospitality management
Numérotation (vol. no.):
February 2017, vol. 61, pp. 119-128
DOI:
ISSN:
0278-4319
Le document apparaît dans:

Note: The status of this file is: restricted


 Notice créée le 2017-10-31, modifiée le 2018-07-09

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