Informal care, long term-care insurance and intrafamily moral hazard: empirical evidence from Italy and Spain

Courbage, Christophe (Haute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale) ; Montoliu-Montes, Guillem (Haute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale ; Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne, Switzerland) ; Wagner, Joël (Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne, Switzerland)

Intra-family moral hazard refers to the disincentive for informal caregivers to provide care to their dependent relatives in the presence of long-term care (LTC) insurance. This article uses crosssectional data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) database to test the effect of both public and private LTC insurance on the reception of informal care in Italy and Spain. The results support the hypothesis of intra-family moral hazard for Spain in the case of public LTC insurance while they reject it for Italy. They confirm recent theoretical findings showing that fixed insurance benefits provide much less disincentives to offer informal care than proportional insurance benefits.


Mots-clés:
Type de conférence:
full paper
Ecole:
HEG GE Haute école de gestion de Genève
Institut:
CRAG - Centre de Recherche Appliquée en Gestion
Classification:
Economie/gestion
Adresse bibliogr.:
Munich, Germany, 21-22 March 2018
Date:
Munich, Germany
21-22 March 2018
2018
Pagination:
17 p.
Titre du document hôte:
Proceedings of Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft
Le document apparaît dans:

Note: The status of this file is: restricted


 Notice créée le 2018-04-09, modifiée le 2018-05-02

Fichiers:
Télécharger le document
PDF

Évaluer ce document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Pas encore évalué)