Une nouvelle approche des relations entre la gouvernance d'entreprise, la RSE et la performance financière

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Résumé :

Cet article explore les liens mutuels entre la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE), la gouvernance d'entreprise (GE), et de la performance financière de l'entreprise (PF). Nous analysons dans mesure les structures de gouvernance d'une entreprise peuvent influer sur ses pratiques en matière de RSE et avoir un impact sur ses performances financières. Pour prendre en compte les interactions mutuelles entre ces variables, nous proposons un modèle
global, fondé sur l’approche « partial least squares path modelling » (PLS-PM), en utilisant un échantillon de 486 grandes entreprises américaines et européennes pour la période 2002-2011. Nos résultats mettent en évidence un impact positif de la gouvernance d'entreprise et des variables financières sur la RSE. Le principal déterminant de la RSE est la gouvernance des firmes dans le cadre de leurs contraintes financières (majoritairement l’effet de levier) L'effet de levier leur permet d'obtenir plus de ressources financières et affecte positivement leurs pratiques en matière de RSE. Cela confirme également l'hypothèse qui stipule que l'effet attendu des pratiques de RSE est une diminution de la perception du risque par les investisseurs et l'amélioration de la performance financière de l'entreprise, ce qui conduit les banques à appliquer de meilleures conditions de prêt à ces entreprises.

L'adoption des principes de RSE augmente principalement la performance comptable de l'entreprise et, secondairement, sa performance boursière. Cependant, dans notre modèle, nous avons un double effet. Nous identifions le lien direct entre la gouvernance et la performance financière d’une part et un lien indirect entre ces deux variables médiatisé par la RSE d’autre part. Cette deuxième relation, qui n’est pas explorée dans la littérature, renforce l’impact de la bonne gouvernance sur la performance financière.

**Mots-clés :** responsabilité sociale des entreprises, RSE, Gouvernance d’entreprise, Performance, Score.
A New Approach of Relationships between Corporate Governance, CSR, and Financial Performance

Abstract:
This paper explores the mutual links between corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance (CG), and corporate financial performance (CFP). We aim to investigate the extent to which a firm’s internal CG structures may influence its CSR practices and the resulting impact on its financial performances. To take into account the mutual interactions between these variables, we propose a global model, based on the partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM), using a sample of 486 large U.S. and Europeans firms for the period 2002–2011. Our results highlight a positive impact of corporate governance and financial variables on CSR. The main determinant of CSR is the governance under financial constraints (firm leverage mainly). Firms’ leverage allows them to obtain more financial resources and positively affects their CSR practices. This also verifies the hypothesis which states that the expected effect of CSR practices is a decrease in the risk perceived by investors and improvement of the financial performance of the firm, which leads banks to apply better conditions to firms’ loan contracts. The adoption of CSR principles is found to increase primarily the firm’s accounting performance and secondarily its market performance. However, in our model, we have a double effect. We underline the direct link between CG and financial performance and identify an indirect link between these two variables mediated by CSR. This second relationship, not explored in the literature, reinforces the impact of good CG on financial performance.

Key words: Corporate social responsibility, CSR, Corporate governance, Performance, Score.
A New Approach of Relationships between Corporate Governance, CSR, and Financial Performance

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance (CG), corporate financial performance (CFP), and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been important research issues for decades, and have been the subject of several studies in the literature. CSR has been presented as a set of self-regulating practices led by companies and is generally addressed in terms of stakeholder perspective. However, the implementation of CSR often goes far beyond the context of the company. The relationship between CG and CSR has been studied in conjunction with the relationship between CSR and CFP. In fact in these studies, CG is analysed as a pre-requisite or a component of CSR policy (Jamali et al., 2008; Roshima et al., 2009). The considerable number of studies that examine the interrelations among CSR and CFP report conflicting evidence (Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2009; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; McGuire et al., 1988).

This lack of consistency in the results may be explained by two factors. First, the relationships between CG, CSR, and financial performance are partially explored in pairs, sometimes including the fact that these factors may operate in reverse and create a synergetic circle, but they are not examined as a whole (Waddock and Graves, 1997). However, these relationships are more complex, and a global model is required to better understand them (Flammer, 2015). Second, the multiplicity of data and methodologies used can explain the different empirical results observed. Specifically, a problem of endogeneity exists between CSR and CFP variables, and the strength of the link between financial and CSR performances depends on the way in which the two performances are measured, as well as numerous moderating variables (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Gramlich and Finster, 2013).

The objective of this paper is to understand the mutual links between CG, financial variables, CSR, and CFP based on a comprehensive empirical model that takes into account interactions between these different factors as the theory suggests. Thus, we aim to investigate the extent to which a firm’s internal CG structures and financial variables may influence its CSR
practices and the impact of these practices on the market and accounting performances of the firm.

In fact, while the profitability of a socially responsible approach has been examined continuously, no satisfactory answer has emerged to date. Margolis and Walsh (2003) are interested in the relationship between CSR and CFP; they find that the direction of causality has not been empirically determined. They reported that CSR was treated as an independent variable in 109 studies of a total of 127 studies, while it was considered a dependent variable in 22 of the 127 studies. Beurden and Gössling (2008) suggest that both CSP and CFP are broad meta-constructs. Through a detailed study of the literature, they show empirical evidence of a positive correlation between CSR and CFP. They establish that 68% of the studies examined find a significant positive relationship between CSR and CFP, 26% of studies report no significant relationship, and 6% find a significant negative relationship. They document strong evidence of a positive correlation between corporate social and financial performance.

The relationship between CSR and CG has also been studied with reference to stakeholder theory. This theory states that all stakeholders must be satisfied with the decisions taken by the company. Freeman (1984) argues that CSR provides reconciliation between the conflicting interests of stakeholders and shareholders. The company’s objectives and governance must be adjusted to give everyone a fair share of rewards. Dunlop (1998) and Kendall (1999) show that through appropriate CG rules, companies can be seen as creditworthy by all key stakeholders. Keasy and Wright (1997) and MacMillan et al. (2004) add that accountability, compliance, and transparency in CG rules can be achieved through a good understanding of CSR.

Other links on the inter-relationships between CSR, CG, and CFP are also found in the literature. Aguilera, Rupp, and Ganapathi (2007) suggest that CSR increases the trustworthiness of a company and enhances relationships with key stakeholders, which can decrease transaction costs and increase attractiveness to investors (Hancock, 2005).

Much of the previous literature has discussed CG, CFP, and CSR independently (Bhimani, 2008; Flammer, 2015). Most studies suggest that guidelines, mechanisms, and standard reporting of these concepts have evolved separately. For instance, Jamali (2008) is among the minority of researchers who have studied the simultaneous interactions between CG, CSR, and CFP. She suggests there is discernible overlap between CG and CSR. She presumes that...
CG and CSR are strongly and intricately connected, and that the literature has failed to provide consistent explanations for this relationship. She suggested that under the umbrella of CG, companies are encouraged to promote transparency and accountability in all their dealings. Firms are expected to continue generating profits while maintaining the highest standards of governance internally.

Our paper makes two major contributions to the extant literature by examining the links among CSR, CG, and CFP. First, based on the extensive literature focusing on the efficiency effects of CSR, we study, simultaneously, how the internal CG structures of a company can influence its CSR practices and how CG and CSR will affect the accounting profitability and market performance of the firm. Our results show strong empirical evidence that CG positively affects CSR practices for large European and American companies. This implies that well-governed firms are more likely to adopt CSR strategies. Specifically, our work differs from previous empirical studies by focusing on a more basic issue; we test whether CSR practices are motivated by objectives other than firm value maximisation.

Second, most studies have only examined the effects of CG on CFP, or CSR on CFP, but not their mutual interactions. They report conflicting evidence (Margolis et al., 2009; Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2009; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; McGuire et al., 1988; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). While this is mainly attributed to inadequate methodological approaches and problems of endogeneity (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000), recent studies that have tried to better control these problems still show similar mixed results (Cai et al., 2012; Scholtens, 2008). To deal with the methodological limitations of previous studies, in this paper, we employ the partial least squares (PLS)-path approach, which has proven suitable for structural equation models. This specification does not make any assumption about the distribution of variables. It provides a flexible approach to deal with a large data set showing high correlation among variables.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework and presents the related literature. Section 3 presents our methodology and describes the data used. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section presents a literature review related to the relationships between CG, CSR, and CFP. Then, it develops our research hypotheses on the effect of CG and financial resources on
CSR strategy and the impact of CG and CSR on the market and accounting performances of the firm.

1.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSR

The relationship between CSR and CG has been widely discussed in recent research in reference to problems with conflicts between various stakeholder interests (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012; Starks, 2009). A large part of the literature defends the idea that the adoption of CSR policies leads to the implementation of new standards regulations and better CG mechanisms within a company (Albareda et al., 2008; Joseph, 2003; Walsh and Lowry, 2005). Previous studies’ results are still inconclusive; at the very least, they still warrant further research. The adoption of CSR principles could not be perceived as the simple result of a marginal decision in the firm; instead, the adoption of these principles is part of the firm’s culture and concerns all its hierarchical components. The decision to adopt these principles is taken at the top of the firm. Stakeholders need to ensure that managers apply the CSR principles in accordance with decisions taken to enhance the development of appropriate internal CG mechanisms for this purpose.

These CG mechanisms promoting CSR emerged following famous accounting scandals as Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco, and Worldcom (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). The objective was to offset the attack on investors’ interests. Companies are required to ensure more transparency in the financial statements disclosures and their governance system. Disclosure of information on the management team responsible for the implementation of CSR activities has become increasingly common.

In the same context, the standard approach to governance was based on the basic objective of firm value maximisation. That is, the objective of good governance is to align the interests of stakeholders and managers at a low cost to the firm (Turnbull, 2015).

Waddock and Graves (1997) defend the idea that CG sets up an equilibrium between economic and social objectives, as well as between individual and community goals. Based on a large sample of firms from the S&P 500, Tsoutsoura (2004) finds that when board members own a large portion of stocks, firms are more sensitive to CSR practices. This may be due to the positive impact of social responsibility activities on the firm’s financial performance.
In light of this review, we hypothesise the existence of a significant relationship between CG and CSR. This argument was shared by Kendall (1999), who supports the idea that good governance preserves stakeholder interests related to CSR policy. Barnea and Rubin (2010) claim that top management tends to over-invest in CSR activities in order to build their own personal reputation as good citizens, which may increase conflicts between stakeholders. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) confirm the previous results of Aguilera et al. (2007) and find evidence that in well-governed firms (i.e. firms depicting high levels of accountability, responsibility, and transparency), managers are more likely to undertake positive CSR practices. Their results show that board size, board diversity, and the number of independents significantly affect CSR practices in the firm.

Referring to all these arguments, we claim that further research is needed to provide a clearer understanding of how CSR and CG are related. Drawing on the above discussion, we posit the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. Well-governed firms are more likely to adopt CSR practices.

1.2. Financial Variables and CSR

Many studies have examined the relationship between the specific characteristics of firms and their CSR practices in order to identify their financial and non-financial determinants. For the financial determinants, the research is mainly based on slack resource theory, which suggests that better financial performance results in more available resources that may be allocated to CSR activities (Waddock and Graves, 1997). We argue that this relationship will be mediated by the firm’s size, intangibles, and leverage as well. Focusing on the impact of size on the CSR orientation of the firm, Tsoutsoura (2004) shows that large firms are more likely to adopt CSR principles than are small businesses. In fact, the important role of large firms in the economy leads them to seek greater visibility, transparency, and attraction for investors. Thus, they need to integrate CSR activities into their business in order improve their market reputation.

Using different methodological approaches, Adams et al. (1998), Neu et al. (1998), Guillén et al. (2002), Brammer and Pavelin (2004), and Haniffa and Cooke (2005) find that the extent of corporate social disclosure is positively related to the size of the company. Thus, larger companies are expected to have high systematic risk and put greater emphasis on the long term than smaller companies. Therefore, companies disclose corporate social reporting to

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reduce risk and reassure investors. In related work, Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) argue that the size of the firm has a significant effect on the relationship between CSR and CFP. They claim that large companies are more likely to engage in CSR initiatives than are small companies.

Intangible assets play also a role. For Surroca et al. (2010), intangible assets moderate the relationship between corporate social performance and CFP, and vice versa. Intangibles such as reputation, trust, and capacity to innovate, which are widely recognised as fundamental to strong financial performance, are at the same time integral to the CSR agenda (Brondoni, 2010). Thus, an intimate link exists between intangibles and CSR, and we can suppose that investments in intangibles are increasing with the level of CSR practices.

Among studies interested in the impact of financial structure on the adoption of CSR rules, Purushothaman et al. (2000) find that high-leverage firms have closer relationships with their creditors and use other means to disclose social responsibility information. Brammer and Millington (2005) argue that a high level of leverage negatively affects the reputation of the company. Therefore, the firm should perform CSR practices to improve its image on the stock market. But Zweibel (1996) shows that excessive company debt increases interest expenses, which discourages investment in CSR. Thus, compliance with shareholder profitability goals is often in conflict with the costs of setting up of CSR practices in the company. For this reason, the ability to invest in CSR practices of a firm will depend on its economic performance. So, financial resources allocated to CSR activities simply come from current operations, which can be measured by the operating income. The main advantage of this financial indicator is that it does not take financial structure and taxes into account (Ernst & Young’s Corporate Responsibility Report, 2012).

Based on the previous discussion, we present four testable hypotheses on the determinants of CSR practices as follows.

Hypothesis 2a. Firm size positively influences CSR practices.
Hypothesis 2b. Investments in intangibles are increasing with the level of CSR practices.
Hypothesis 2c. Firm leverage positively affects CSR practices.
Hypothesis 2d. A firm’s operating income positively influences CSR practices.

1.3. CSR AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
While the determinants of a company’s social responsibility have been the subject of numerous studies, the main problem addressed has been testing the impact of CSR practices on company performance.

The literature related to this issue may be split into two strands. The first dominates the literature and has attempted to test the impact of CSR on accounting performance. However, another set of studies has focused on firms’ market performance. In general, accounting models more often show significant, positive results than do market models. However, no clear consensus has been reached in the literature.

Moreover, the major problem with accounting models is the number of samples, as it is limited to yearly or quarterly observations that may be hard to find for long periods (more than 10 years). For market models, the typical approach is event study. However, the simple CAPM model is being abandoned in favour of multifactor models such as the Fama and French, or Fama, MacBeth, and Carhart (1997) models. Regressions in such multifactor models generally lead to significant positive results, whereas CAPM-based models show few results. However, the other methodological problems – the choice of event window, the parametrisation of the model market, and the presence of noise events – can modify the empirical results and greatly limit the interest of this type of study.

Several researchers have found a negative relationship between CSR and CFP (i.e. McGuire et al., 1988; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Vance, 1975). These authors argue that companies engaged in CSR strategies face additional costs which negatively affect their performance. Therefore, they claim that CSR is costly and impacts firm performance negatively. This reasoning is based on the viewpoint of Friedman (1970) and other neoclassical theorists, who suggest that the implementation of social responsibility practices must be directly profitable. This trend of research asserts that CSR is associated with heavy costs that reduce shareholder wealth and that social responsibility strategies should be approved as part of the overall strategy of the firm only when they are likely to increase shareholder profitability. This explains in part the findings of several studies that have attempted explore the link between financial performance and social performance.

In a recent work, Lioui and Sharma (2012) test the effect of CSR on CFP using data from 17 000 firms over the period 1993–2007. They find a negative impact of CSR on firms’ return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. They argue that this negative relationship stems from the fact that investors perceive social initiatives as potential costs or penalties.
Other empirical research has found that CSR does not affect CFP (Aragón-Correa and Rubio-López, 2007; Chand and Fraser, 2006; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Based on different firm samples, these studies do not support any particular relationship between CSR and financial performance of the firm. A third group of researchers has found a positive relationship between CSR activities and financial performance (accounting measures and stock market performance). They argue that the costs of CSR are minimal and the benefits are potentially great. Orlitzky et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between CSR and CFP. They argue that CSR enhances the reputation of firms. In addition, they suggest that CSR raises managerial skills and improves the organisational efficiency of the firm. Margolis et al. (2009) provide a meta-analysis of 251 studies from the period 1972–2007 that investigate the linkage between CSR and CFP. They show that the majority of studies show evidence of a significant positive relationship between the adoption of CSR principles and firm accounting performance.

Focusing in the same issue, Tsoutoura (2004) finds a significant and positive impact of CSR on firms’ return on equity (ROE) and ROA. She supports the view that socially responsible corporate performance can be associated with a series of bottom-line benefits. These results corroborate the findings of previous studies conducted in different markets, such as Russo and Fouts (1997), Nakao et al. (2007), Scholtens (2008), Brammer and Millington (2008), Okamoto (2009), and Yang et al. (2010).

The slack resource theory suggests that this relationship is reversible and can create a synergetic circle. One main determinant of CSR politics is the availability of financial resources, and firms that are able to invest in CSR will perform better (Waddock and Graves, 1997). However, different studies have established that firms’ capacity to invest in CSR depends more on size, leverage, and other investments in intangibles than on their financial performance (Surroca et al., 2010). Thus, these resources, financial and other, are necessary to improve social performance. This problem is explored in our previous hypotheses.

Given the conflicting empirical results related to the relationship between CSR and accounting CFP, we propose in this paper to consider this issue in a flexible framework. We consider accounting CFP a latent variable simultaneously measured by two variables: ROE and ROA. Then, we measure to what extent the engagement of the firm in CSR activities affects the accounting performance of the firm. Therefore, our third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. CSR practices should positively affect the firm’s financial performance (accounting measure).

On the other side, several studies have found evidence of a significant relationship between CSR and stock market performance. In this context, Navarro (1988) and Webb (1996) suggest that CSR practices increase the transaction volume of shares as well as the share price to a certain threshold. Dowell et al. (2000), in a study of the impact of CSR disclosure on firm performance, show that a high level of CSR reporting positively affects the firm’s market performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Focusing on Greek firms, Karagiorgos (2010) shows a positive correlation between stock returns and CSR practices. He concludes that this finding should lead managers to implement CSR actions to a larger extent in order to improve firms’ market efficiency. Despite the costs that may arise when adopting CSR strategies, companies can achieve higher stock returns through the improvement of the company’s reputation in the market. This argument corroborates the objective of firm value maximisation. In this view, several studies use the Tobin’s Q measure to evaluate the market performance of the firm (King and Lenox, 2001; Yamashita et al., 1999; Ziegler et al., 2007). Kempf and Osthoff (2007) find that the strategy of buying stocks with high social responsibility ratings and selling stocks with low social responsibility ratings leads investors to earn remarkably high abnormal returns. In fact, we claim that adopting CSR principles should impact the corporate image on the market, and can be considered a major factor to attract new partners and new capital. Based on these advancements, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

Hypothesis 4. CSR practices positively affect the firm’s stock market performance.

2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

2.1. METHODOLOGY

To test the impact of financial and CG variables on both CSR and CFP, we use a consistent PLS-path approach that allows us to estimate complex causal relationship between latent variables. We use this approach to estimate the coefficients of a structural equation system. The structural equation model combines factorial analysis with path analysis. Factorial analysis is a measurement model (outer model) which specifies the relationships between a latent variable and its observed indicators, also called manifest variables, while path analysis is a structural model (inner model) that measures the relationships between latent variables.
Monecke and Leisch (2012) assert that PLS-path modelling is a soft-modelling technique with minimum demands regarding measurement scales, sample sizes, and residual distributions. Indeed, Chin and Newsted (1999) argue that PLS-path modelling is adapted for modelling complex causal relationships between latent variables with several indicators when sample size is small. Further, Bagozzi and Yi (1994) suggest that PLS-path modelling is applied when distributions are highly skewed, because there are no distributional requirements (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). Moreover, Tenenhaus and Hanafi (2007) suggest that PLS-path modelling can be adapted for estimating multiple tables and is directly related to more classical data analysis methods used in this field. It is a flexible approach to multi-block (or multiple table) analysis using both the hierarchical PLS path model and the confirmatory PLS path model. In fact, it is advisable to apply PLS-path modelling for the estimation of coefficients, because it contributes to more precise estimations than those obtained using other methods. Another main advantage of this method, compared to OLS regression, is that it solves the problem of multicollinearity with the construction of major components. In our research, the outer model is specified with the reflective mode to the extent that manifest variables are chosen so that they reflect the five dimensions (financial variables, CG, CSR, accounting measure of performance, stock market performance) to which they refer. This is the same for groups of variables from the classification. We describe our causal model in figure 1.

Figure 1. The PLS-path model

2.1. DATA SOURCES
We obtain our data from a variety of sources. We collect data for the 486 largest listed companies in the United States and the European Union (in terms of market capitalisation)
over the period 2002–2011. We restrict our data to firms whose financial, governance, and CSR data are available. From the American market, we select the largest 265 companies listed on the S&P 500, while 221 European firms are selected from Euronext. In order to avoid the sector effect, we select only industrial companies. Financial companies are excluded because of their specific financial statements. The CSR scores correspond to the Global EthicalQuote® scores, which are news-based ratings provided by Covalence on various ESG thematic. More details about how Covalence computes those ratings and how they link to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are available on their website (http://www.ethicalquote.com). The governance and financial variables are respectively collected from Asset4 and the OSIRIS databases. In order to test the interconnections between CG, CSR, and CFP, we construct the specific model shown in figure 1. In particular, we consider that the latent variables CSR, accounting measure of financial performance, and stock market performance are the only endogenous latent variables in the model. Each latent variable will be explained by a set of measurable variables. In the measurement model, manifest variables are connected to the corresponding latent variables according to a reflective scheme (figure 1). Table 1 defines the latent variables and their manifest variables.

### Table 1. Latent (LV) and manifest variable (MV) definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variables</th>
<th>Manifest variables</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>CSR Score</td>
<td>Score</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Financial variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>Ln (total assets)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating income</td>
<td>Ln (operating income)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D costs</td>
<td>Ln (R&amp;D costs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt_Equity</td>
<td>Long-term debt / total equity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities_Assets</td>
<td>Total liabilities / total assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Governance commitment</td>
<td>Score (based on 11 proxies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholders’ rights</td>
<td>Score (based on 11 proxies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board matters</td>
<td>Score (based on 11 proxies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Score (based on 10 proxies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td>Score (based on 10 proxies)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Accounting measure of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>Net income / total assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The financial variables are selected following the approaches of Gainet (2010) and Cormier et al. (2005). Four types of financial variables are considered: the size of the firm (Total assets), the investments in intangibles (R&D costs), the financial leverage (measured by Debt_Equity and Liabilities_Assets), and economic performance (Operating income). According to McWilliams and Siegel (2001), operating income explains the economic performance of firms. Moreover, for Surroca et al. (2010), intangible assets moderate the relationship between corporate social performance and CFP, and vice versa. Following Boulerne et al. (2011), this variable has been estimated using R&D costs. Nevertheless, many studies (Nissim and Penman, 2003; Sahut and Othmani, 2010) establish that leverage of the firm is also an important variable explaining firm profitability.

Regarding CG variables, we follow the work of Drobetz et al. (2004) by selecting five categories of governance proxies: (1) CG commitment, (2) shareholders’ rights, (3) transparency, (4) management and supervisory board matters, and (5) auditing. In fact, they developed a questionnaire for these five categories. As our methodological approach is based on the collection of data from Asset4 (listing 266 items on corporate governance), we choose the best items of Asset4 which correspond to each question of their survey (appendix 1).

We also claim that the CG framework should ensure strategic guidance of the company, disclosure transparency, and board accountability to the company. The literature suggests that the proxies we consider in this paper improve the internal governance mechanisms of the company. In particular, Diamond and Verrechia (1982) and Holmstrom and Triole (1993) suggest that the monitoring capacity of the board of directors is an important control mechanism which is supposed to align the interests of managers and shareholders. Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can improve the CG of the company. Moreover, Drobetz et al. (2004) show that auditing activities enhance firm governance.
To compare our approach to previous studies (Dowell et al., 2000; Karagiorgos, 2010), we use Tobin’s Q and the Morris ratio as proxies for firm market performance. Following Tsoutoura (2004), accounting performance is measured by ROE and ROA.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

3.1. RELIABILITY TEST

In this study, we perform PLS-path modelling analysis involving only reflective indicators and the centroid scheme for inner estimation. Each reflective block represents only one latent construct; therefore, it needs to be unidimensional. In fact, to verify the composite reliability of blocks, a preliminary exploratory analysis is required. There are two different measures to test block unidimensionality in the PLS-path modelling framework: Dillon-Goldstein’s rho and Cronbach’s alpha. A block is considered homogeneous if these indicators are greater than 0.7 (Chin, 1998). Table 2 presents the results of our composite reliability test. The results suggest that all five blocks of manifest variables can be considered unidimensional because all coefficients of the Dillon-Goldstein test are greater than 0.7 (even if this is not the case for the Cronbach’s alpha of the two blocks ‘financial variables’ and ‘stock market performance’). In fact, Dillon-Goldstein’s rho is considered a better indicator than Cronbach’s alpha because it is based on results from the model (loadings) rather than on correlations observed between manifest variables in the dataset (Chin and Newsted, 1999).

Table 2. Composite reliability test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variables</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
<th>D.G.’s rho (PCA)</th>
<th>Critical value</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>1.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial variables</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>1.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>2.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting measure of FP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>1.921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock market performance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>1.511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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After verification of the composite reliability, we test the relationships between each manifest variable and its own latent variable. Table 3 summarises the weight of the relationship between each manifest variable and its own latent variable, together with the average communality index, which measures the ability of each latent variable to explain its own manifest variables. For the five latent variables, this index is higher than 0.5. Therefore, we can deduce that, globally, all the latent variables are powerful for explaining their own manifest variables. This confirms the pertinence of the selected manifest variables from the literature (proxies such as total assets for financial variables).

The normalised weights assess the impact of the corresponding manifest variable in computing the latent variable score as an index, as well as the standardised loadings. Regarding the manifest variables for the latent variable ‘financial variables’, we conclude that the four hypotheses that make up H2 are confirmed. Debt_Equity and Liabilities_Assets are the most important drivers in computing this latent variable. This result confirms those of Goss and Roberts (2007), who find that firms with the worst social responsibility scores pay higher loan spreads. Further, Izzo and Magnanelli (2012) argue that socially responsible behaviour and CSR investments imply a reduction of risk (effective and/or perceived by the market), and hence an improvement in the financial performance of the firm, which leads banks to apply better conditions in loan contracts with the firm.

In comparison, size plays a lesser role. In fact, CSR is largely associated with large companies because they attract more media attention and are particularly concerned with protecting and enhancing their reputations with the broader public as well as key stakeholders (Udayasankar, 2008). They are also often better resourced and more able to invest in CSR. However, this study underlines that the role of size is overestimated in the literature, and even if size is correlated with the level of debt, this last factor is a better determinant of CSR practices. R&D costs and operating income, which indicate the degree of familiarity with intangible investments (CSR expenses can be viewed as intangible investments) and financial resources to invest, have relative less importance. These results are consistent with the literature (Surroca et al., 2010) and establish that the combination of these financial factors explains CSR expenses and practices. For the latent variable CG, CG commitment appears to be the most important determinant. The four other determinants play equal secondary roles. This result contradicts some results in the literature, which state that some governance elements, such as an auditing body, have no effect on financial performance (Pae and Choi, 2011).
Finally, the latent variable Accounting measure of financial performance (FP) is mainly driven by the manifest variable ROE, and the Marris ratio determines the Stock market performance. This result is also consistent with the literature, which establishes the relevance of these factors in explaining financial performance (Tsoutsoura, 2004).

**Table 3. Normalised outer weights and average communalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variables</th>
<th>Manifest variables</th>
<th>Normalised outer weights</th>
<th>Average communality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial variables</td>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operating income</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R&amp;D costs</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debt_Equity</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liabilities_Assets</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>Corporate governance commitment</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shareholders’ rights</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board matters</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting measure of FP</td>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock market performance</td>
<td>Tobin’s Q</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marris ratio</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Efron and Tibshirani (1993) suggest that the distribution of PLS estimates is unknown and conventional significance tests are impossible to perform. However, a significance test may be accomplished using bootstrap methods. From the bootstrap estimation, we can conclude that our PLS estimates are significant because the differences between standardised loadings and ‘bootstrap coefficients’ are small and not significant.
3.2. THE STRUCTURAL MODEL

In the next step, we show the results of the structural model estimates. Figure 2 reports the coefficient estimates of model.

Table 4 presents correlation statistics and regression coefficients linking each endogenous latent variable to its exogenous variables. The table shows that CSR depends primarily on CG, expressing the higher path coefficient of 0.174 and the higher R² contribution (77%), while the financial variables appear to have lower impact on CSR (0.126) and lower contribution to the model's R².

Regarding the effect of manifest variables on the accounting financial performance measures, we find that financial variables have a strongly significant positive impact on firm accounting performance (path coefficient 0.137 and R² contribution higher than 48%). CG and CSR variables have significant but lower impacts on accounting CFP. These variables appear significant at the 5% level.

For stock market performance, the results also establish that CG appears to be the most important relevant variable. It exerts a significant positive effect on firm market performance.
(path coefficient = 0.097). This result corroborates the findings of Lin et al. (2012), who show a positive relationship between CG and stock market performance. The effects of CSR and financial variables on stock market performance are secondary. These variables appear significant at the 10% level.

In fact, firm accounting performance appears to be more affected by CSR practices than by market performance. This result confirms the recent studies in this domain, which demonstrate the better relevance of accounting measures of performance (Gramlich and Finster, 2013) and that the function linking a stock’s performance to its ESG (environmental, social and governance)-score changes is probably non-linear (Pasquini-Descomps and Sahut, 2015). However, compared to these studies, we have the main advantage of analysing the effects of CSR on accounting and stock market performances practices at the same time.

Moreover, our results are consistent with slack resource theory which suggests that the relationships between CSR and financial resources or performance are not unilateral (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Our model establishes that the main determinant of CSR is governance under financial constraints. Firms’ leverage allows them to obtain more financial resources and positively affects their CSR practices. This also verifies the hypothesis which states that the expected effect of CSR practices is a decrease in the risk perceived by investors and improvement of the financial performance of the firm, which leads banks to apply better conditions to firms’ loan contracts.

We also note that the relationship between CG and financial performance (market or accounting measures) is consistent with several empirical studies that report a consensus concerning the positive association between these two variables (Bird et al., 2007; Bhimani, 2008; Orlitzky et al., 2003, Antolín and Gago, 2004). However, in our model, we have a double effect; we underline the direct link between CG and financial performance and identify an indirect link between these two variables mediated by CSR. This second relationship, not explored in the literature, reinforces the impact of good CG on financial performance. Thus, we support the finding that engagement in CSR practices improves a company’s financial performance. The adoption of CSR practices strengthens the firm’s competitiveness in the market and improves the management process of the firm. With time, this leads to improvement in the financial performance of the firm (Husted and Allen, 2007).
Table 4. Structural (inner) model results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects on CSR</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Path coefficient</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
<th>Contribution to R² (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial variables</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>22.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.174***</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>77.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Effects on accounting measure of FP |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| CSR                                 | 0.09        | 0.061**          | 2.18        | 31.53                  |
| Financial variables                | 0.35        | 0.137***         | 3.67        | 48.02                  |
| Corporate governance               | 0.12        | 0.022**          | 2.35        | 20.45                  |

| Effects on stock market performance |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| CSR                                 | 0.07        | 0.083*           | 1.77        | 12.89                  |
| Financial variables                | 0.12        | 0.054*           | 1.84        | 24.63                  |
| Corporate governance               | 0.39        | 0.097***         | 3.46        | 62.48                  |

The notations ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

For the three equations that respectively explain CSR, the accounting measure of financial performance, and stock market performance, we obtain R² of 0.572, 0.266, and 0.183 (Table 5). These R² can be considered good results. The coefficients of the goodness-of-fit (GoF) index are satisfactory with an absolute GoF coefficient of 0.425 and similar coefficients for the outer and the inner models (Table 6). In particular, the GoF statistic of the inner model is 92.5%, which implies that our model is well built and validates the significance of the relationship found between proxies of the variables used above.

These results confirm that working with the most recent practicable data with a long observation period (2002–2011 in this dataset) provides a certain significance during statistical tests. In fact, the availability of CSR data might limit researchers’ ability to provide consistent results. Revelli and Viviani’s (2013) recent meta-analysis established that an observation period of less than five years tends to show negative coefficients, whereas five to 10 years of data usually provides the most positive results.

They also record that having an observation panel of more than 100 samples will greatly increase significance. Nonetheless, the most common practical issue causing discrepancies in results might be sampling frequency. Orlitzky et al. (2013) believe this to be the main cause of variance among CSR studies.
Table 5. Quality estimation of the three partial models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$R^2$ (Bootstrap)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Lower bound (95%)</th>
<th>Upper bound (95%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSR /1</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting measure of FP /1</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock market performance /1</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Goodness-of-fit index for the entire model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GoF</th>
<th>GoF (Bootstrap)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Lower bound (95%)</th>
<th>Upper bound (95%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer model</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner model</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. CONCLUSION

The inter-relationship between CSR, the CG and financial performance of companies has been studied separately in the literature and previous studies show conflicting results. The purpose of this paper is to test jointly these relationships using the Partial Least Square-Path Modelling (PLS-PM). In this work, we introduced social responsibility (CSR) as a set of strategies directly affected by the system of governance of the firm and which has a significant effect on the accounting performance and market performance of the firm. This approach avoids the problem of endogeneity, which exists between CSR and financial performance variables (Flammer, 2015).

Our results show a positive impact of CG and financial variables on (CSR). The main determinant of CSR is the governance under financial constraints (firm leverage mainly and size). The adoption of CSR principles is found to increases the financial performances of the firm. But, the accounting firm performance appeared more affected by CSR practices than market performance. Finally, we establish a double impact, direct and indirect (through CSR), of CG on financial performance, while the literature has been content to study the direct link.

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Globally, our finding corroborates previous researches in the literature supporting that CSR leads to a paradigm shift that could form the basis of a responsible governance model. This model aims to create value while respecting the environmental, social and societal factors. The main limitation of our study concerns our data, and especially the CSR scores. The use of news-based ratings can be more appropriate with event studies. In addition, it would be interesting to further study the link between ESG rating and financial performance with regard to a larger sample and other countries.

Références


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### Appendix 1 - Definition of Corporate Governance Variables

**Definition of corporate governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate governance</th>
<th>Corporate Governance Commitment</th>
<th>Score (based on 11 proxies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder’s rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>Score (based on 11 proxies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Matters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Score (based on 11 proxies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Score (based on 10 proxies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Score (based on 10 proxies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I/ List of the 11 proxies for Corporate Governance Commitment

1/ CGBFDP005, Corporate Governance Committee, Does the company have a corporate governance committee?

2/ CGBFDP0012, Board Functions and Committees Policy Elements/Nomination, Does the company have a policy to maintain an effective and independent nomination committee?

3/ CGBFDP0013, Board Functions and Committees Policy Elements/Compensation, Does the company have a policy to maintain an effective and independent compensation committee?

4/ CGBFDP0011, Board Functions and Committees Policy Elements/Audit, Does the company have a policy to maintain an effective and independent audit committee?
5/ CGBFDP0017, Board Functions and Committees Policy Elements/Effective Board, Does the company have a general, all-purpose policy on the effectiveness and independence of its board committees?

6/ SOCODP0019, Community Reputation Policy Elements/Business Ethics, Does the company have a general, all-purpose policy regarding business ethics?

7/ CGBFDP0021, Board Functions and Committees Policy Compliance/Audit, Does the company comply with regulations regarding audit committees?

8/ CGBFDP0022, Board Functions and Committees Policy Compliance/Nomination, Does the company comply with regulations regarding nomination committees?

9/ CGBFDP0023, Board Functions and Committees Policy Compliance/Compensation, Does the company comply with regulations regarding compensation committees?

10/ CGBFDP0027, Board Functions and Committees Policy Compliance/Effective Board, Does the company comply with regulations regarding the general effectiveness and independence of its board committees?

11/ CGBFO08S, Score - Board Functions/Nomination Committee Processes, Does the nomination committee have the responsibility for the selection, appointment and succession procedures for board members or executives?

II/ List of the 11 proxies for Shareholder’s rights

1/ CGSRD01S, Score - Shareholder Rights/Policy, Does the company have a policy for ensuring equal treatment of minority shareholders, facilitating shareholder engagement or limiting the use of anti-takeover devices?

2/ CGSRD02S, Score - Shareholder Rights/Implementation, Does the company describe the implementation of its shareholder rights policy?

3/ CGSRD03S, Score - Shareholder Rights/Monitoring, Does the company monitor the shareholder rights through the establishment of a corporate governance committee?

4/ CGSRD04S, Score - Shareholder Rights/Improvements, Does the company have the necessary internal improvement and information tools to develop appropriate shareholder rights principles?

5/ CGSRDP0011, Shareholder Rights Policy Elements/Equal Voting Right, Does the company have a policy to apply the one-share, one-vote principle?

6/ CGSRDP0012, Shareholder Rights Policy Elements/Anti-Takeover, Does the company have a policy limiting the use of anti-takeover devices?

7/ CGSRDP0013, Shareholder Rights Policy Elements/Shareholder Engagement, Does the company have a policy to facilitate shareholder engagement, resolutions or proposals?

8/ CGSRDP0016, Shareholder Rights Policy Elements/Shareholder Rights, Does the company have a general, all-purpose policy regarding shareholder rights?

9/ CGSRDP0021, Shareholder Rights Policy Compliance/Equal Voting Right, Does the company comply with regulations regarding equal voting rights principles?

10/ CGSRDP0022, Shareholder Rights Policy Compliance/Anti-Takeover, Does the company comply with regulations regarding anti-takeover devices?

11/ CGSRDP0023, Shareholder Rights Policy Compliance/Shareholder Engagement, Does the company comply with regulations regarding shareholder engagement, resolutions or proposals?
III / List of the 11 proxies for Board Matters

1/ CGBSDP019, Board Structure Type, The company has a unitary board structure, a classical two-tier board structure with a supervisory board or a mixed two-tiered board structure with a board of directors and a supervisory board.

2/ CGBSO07S, Score - Board Structure/Independent Board Members, Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company.

3/ CGBSO08S, Board Independence, Average tenure of the outside directors/ number of years the CEO has held his position.

4/ CGBSO01S, Score - Board Structure/Size of Board, Total number of board members which are in excess of ten or below eight.

5/ CGBSO09S, Score - Board Structure/CEO-Chairman Separation, Does the CEO simultaneously chair the board? AND Has the chairman of the board been the CEO of the company?

6/ CGBSD021, Score - Board Structure, Does the diversity and spread of talent within the board reflect the company’s needs?

7/ CGBFDP010, Board Functions and Committees Improvement Tools, Does the company have the necessary internal improvement and information tools to develop appropriate and effective board functions and committees?

8/ CGCPD01S, Score - Compensation Policy/Policy, Does the company have a policy for performance-oriented compensation that attracts and retain the senior executives and board members?

9/ CGCPD03S, Score - Compensation Policy/Monitoring, Does the company monitor the senior executives and board compensation?

10/ CGBFO10S, Score - Board Functions/Board Meetings, Number of board meetings per year.

11/ CGBFDP027, Board Meeting Attendance Average, The average overall attendance percentage of board meetings as reported by the company.

IV/ List of the 10 proxies for Transparency

1/ ECSLDP0012, Financial Transparency, Does the company have a policy to improve financial transparency?

2/ ECCL03S, Score - Client Loyalty/Customer Satisfaction Transparency, Does the company report the percentage of customer satisfaction?

3/ SOCODP015, EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Is the company a supporter of the "Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)?

4/ CGVSO05S, Score - Vision and Strategy/Transparency, Does the company publish a separate CSR/H&S/Sustainability report or publish a section in its annual report on CSR/H&S/Sustainability?

5/ ECSLO15S, Score - Shareholder Loyalty/Auditor Independence, Does the company report on the number of years after which it rotates its statutory auditor?

6/ CGBFO02S, Score - Board Functions/Audit Committee Management Independence, Does the company report that all audit committee members are non-executives?
7/ ECPEDP039, Employee Satisfaction, The percentage of employee satisfaction as reported by the company.
8/ CGBFO09S, Score - Board Functions, Does the company report or show to constantly supervise the performance of board members or executives?
9/ CGCPD02S, Score - Compensation Policy/Implementation, Does the company describe the implementation of its compensation policy?
10/ CGBFDP0023, Score - Compliance/Compensation, Does the company comply with regulations regarding compensation publication

V/ List of the 10 proxies for Auditing
1/ ECSLDP005, Audit Committee, Does the company have an audit committee?
2/ ECSLDP061, Auditor Independence Rotation, The number of years after which the company rotates its statutory auditor.
3/ CGBFDP018, Audit Committee Independence, Percentage of independent board members on the audit committee as stipulated by the company.
4/ CGBFDP019, Audit Committee Non-Executive Member, Percentage of non-executive board members on the audit committee as stipulated by the company.
5/ ECSLDP064, Audit Service Fees, Fees paid to auditor for audit services.
6/ ECSLDP065, Audit-Related Service Fees, Fees paid to auditor for audit-related services.
7/ ECSLDP066, Non-Audit Service Fees, Fees paid to auditor for non-audit services.
8/ ECSLO16S, Score - Non-audit to Audit Fees Ratio, All non-audit fees divided by the audit and audit-related fees paid to the group auditor.
9/ CGVSDP030, CSR Sustainability External Audit, Does the company have an external auditor of its CSR/H&S/Sustainability report?
10/ CGBF003S, Score - Board Functions/Audit Committee Expertise, Does the company have an audit committee with at least three members and at least one "financial expert" within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley?