000001887 001__ 1887
000001887 005__ 20181220113741.0
000001887 037__ $$aREPORT_SBM
000001887 041__ $$aeng
000001887 245__ $$bare millions of nays inevitable?$$aGreen taxes in a post-Paris world :
000001887 260__ $$c2016$$bCentre for Climate Change Economics and Policy$$aLeeds
000001887 269__ $$a2016-06
000001887 300__ $$a45 p.
000001887 506__ $$avisible
000001887 520__ $$aTurning greenhouse gas emissions pledges into domestic policies is the next challenge for governments. We address the question of the acceptability of cost-effective climate policy in a real-voting setting. First, we analyze voting behavior in a large ballot on energy taxes, rejected in Switzerland in 2015 by more than 2 million people. Energy taxes were aimed at completely replacing the current value-added tax. We examine the determinants of voting and find that distributional and competitiveness concerns reduced the acceptability of energy taxes, along with the perception of ineffectiveness. Most people would have preferred tax revenues to be allocated for environmental purposes. Second, at the same time of the ballot, we tested the acceptability of alternative designs of a carbon tax with a choice experiment survey on a representative sample of the Swiss population. Survey respondents are informed about environmental, distributional and competitiveness effects of each carbon tax design. These impacts are estimated with a computable general equilibrium model. This original setting generates a series of novel results. Providing information on the expected environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes reduces the demand for environmental earmarking. Making distributional effects salient generates an important demand for progressive designs, e.g. social cushioning or recycling via lump-sum transfers. The case of lump-sum recycling is particularly striking: it is sufficient to show its desirable distributional properties to make it one of the most preferred designs, which corresponds to a completely novel result in the literature. We show that providing proper information on the functioning of environmental taxes can close both the gap between acceptability ex ante and ex post and the gap between economists’ prescriptions and the preferences of the general public.$$9eng
000001887 592__ $$aHEG - Genève
000001887 592__ $$bCRAG - Centre de Recherche Appliquée en Gestion
000001887 592__ $$cEconomie et Services
000001887 6531_ $$acarbon taxes$$9eng
000001887 6531_ $$aacceptability$$9eng
000001887 6531_ $$apolitical economy$$9eng
000001887 6531_ $$aballot data$$9eng
000001887 6531_ $$achoice experiment$$9eng
000001887 65017 $$aEconomie/gestion
000001887 700__ $$uGrantham Research Institute on climate change and the environment, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)$$uHaute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale ;$$aCarattini, Stefano
000001887 700__ $$uHaute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale$$aBaranzini, Andrea
000001887 700__ $$uSwiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL)$$aThalmann, Philippe
000001887 700__ $$aVarone, Frédéric$$uDepartment of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva
000001887 700__ $$aVöhringer, Frank$$uSwiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL)
000001887 8564_ $$uhttps://hesso.tind.io/record/1887/files/carattini_greentaxes_2016.pdf$$s1048169
000001887 906__ $$aGREEN
000001887 909CO $$pGLOBAL_SET$$ooai:hesso.tind.io:1887
000001887 950__ $$aI4
000001887 980__ $$arapport