Informal care, long term-care insurance and intrafamily moral hazard : empirical evidence from Italy and Spain

Courbage, Christophe (Haute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale) ; Montoliu-Montes, Guillem (Haute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // Haute Ecole Spécialisée de Suisse Occidentale ; Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne, Switzerland) ; Wagner, Joël (Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne, Switzerland)

Intra-family moral hazard refers to the disincentive for informal caregivers to provide care to their dependent relatives in the presence of long-term care (LTC) insurance. This article uses crosssectional data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) database to test the effect of both public and private LTC insurance on the reception of informal care in Italy and Spain. The results support the hypothesis of intra-family moral hazard for Spain in the case of public LTC insurance while they reject it for Italy. They confirm recent theoretical findings showing that fixed insurance benefits provide much less disincentives to offer informal care than proportional insurance benefits.


Keywords:
Conference Type:
full paper
Faculty:
Economie et Services
School:
HEG - Genève
Institute:
CRAG - Centre de Recherche Appliquée en Gestion
Subject(s):
Economie/gestion
Publisher:
Munich, Germany, 21-22 March 2018
Date:
Munich, Germany
21-22 March 2018
2018
Pagination:
17 p.
Published in
Proceedings of Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft
Appears in Collection:

Note: The status of this file is: restricted


 Record created 2018-04-09, last modified 2019-04-11

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