Taking the perspective of the socioemotional wealth theory, we investigate the earnings management (EM) behavior of different types of family firms. Specifically, we use a Swiss sample of 1,544 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2018 to examine how Identity (i.e., the family name included in the firm name), indirect Control (i.e., the family holding over 50% of the firm’s voting rights), and direct Control (i.e., the appointment of a family member as Chairperson or CEO) dimensions are separately and jointly associated with EM. First, we find that family firms with more salient Identity and indirect Control dimensions exhibit less EM than non-family firms. Then, we show that these two dimensions are only associated with EM when there is also direct family involvement in the board of directors or the managing board and that, in those cases, indirect Control is positively associated with EM. Finally, we exploit a Swiss-specific option to voluntarily turn away from IFRS to local GAAP. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that family firms where both Identity and indirect Control dimensions are present exhibit higher levels of EM after the switch. Our findings contribute to the literature on the effect of ownership structures and family involvement on EM incentives.